Interim Within-Season Estimate of the Effectiveness of Trivalent Inactivated Influenza Vaccine -Marshfield, Wisconsin, 2007-08 Influenza Season
During clinical trials, the efficacy of vaccination with inactivated influenza vaccines for the prevention of serologically confirmed influenza infection has been estimated as high as 70%-90% among healthier adults. However, the effectiveness of annual influenza vaccination typically is lower during those influenza seasons when a suboptimal match between the vaccine strains and circulating influenza strains is observed. For example, in a 4-year randomized study of influenza vaccine among healthy persons aged 1-65 years, the predominant strain was drifted from the vaccine strain in 2 of the 4 years. Inactivated vaccine effectiveness (VE) against culture-confirmed influenza ranged from 71% to 79% when the vaccine and circulating strains were suboptimally matched to 74% to 79% when the matches were well matched (1) . In contrast, a 2-year study of inactivated influenza vaccine among healthy adults aged 18-64 years found no measurable VE during a year when a poorly matched strain circulated, but found VE of 86% against laboratory-confirmed influenza during the following year when the vaccine and circulating strains were well matched (2) . Although laboratory data on the antigenic characteristics of circulating influenza viruses compared with vaccine strains are available during influenza seasons, estimates of VE usually have not been made until months after the conclusion of the season. This report summarizes interim results of a 2008 case-control study to estimate the effectiveness of trivalent inactivated influenza vaccine for prevention of medically attended, laboratory-confirmed influenza during the 2007-08 influenza season, when most circulating influenza A (H3N2) and B viruses were suboptimally matched to the vaccine strains. Despite the suboptimal match between two of three vaccine strains and circulating influenza strains, overall VE in the study population during January 21- February 8, 2008 , was 44%.
These findings demonstrate that, in any season, assessment of the clinical effectiveness of influenza vaccines cannot be determined solely by laboratory evaluation of the degree of antigenic match between vaccine and circulation strains.
Patients living in a 14 postal-code area surrounding Marshfield, Wisconsin, were eligible to participate in this study. Nearly all residents in this area receive outpatient and inpatient care from Marshfield Clinic health-care providers. Study enrollment began on January 21, 2008, based on laboratory evidence of influenza circulation from both Marshfield Clinic laboratories and the Wisconsin State Laboratory of Hygiene and continued through March 28, 2008 . Patients who visited a Marshfield Clinic facility with medically attended illnesses were screened for study eligibility during outpatient or inpatient visits. Patients who reported feverishness, chills, or cough were eligible for enrollment. Those who reported symptoms for 8 or more days were not eligible for enrollment because influenza virus shedding decreases with illness duration, making detection of the virus unlikely after 8 days of symptoms. The majority of ill patients not approached during a clinical encounter were identified the next day by using electronic diagnosis codes entered by the clinician; these patients were contacted by telephone and enrolled at home if they met eligibility criteria. The Marshfield Clinic Research Foundation institutional review board approved this study.
Nasal or nasopharyngeal swabs were obtained from consenting patients and were tested for influenza A or B infection by reverse transcription-polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) at the Marshfield Clinic Research Foundation using CDC-recommended probes and primers. Viral culture was performed on all samples that were RT-PCR positive to provide virus isolates for antigenic characterization. Influenza vaccination status was determined through an immunization information system (Regional Early Childhood Immunization Network*) used by all public and private immunization providers for vaccines administered to adults and children. Previous validations have demonstrated that the system captures 96%-98% of influenza vaccines For this case-control study, a case of medically attended influenza was defined as an acute illness in a patient with feverishness, chills, or cough and documentation of influenza infection by RT-PCR. Controls were defined as patients with the same symptoms who had a negative RT-PCR test for influenza. Using persons with actute respiratory symptoms who test negative for influenza as controls is a method that in modeling studies has compared favorably with cohort studies and traditional case-control designs for the assessment of vaccine effectiveness (3) . Patients were categorized as immunized if they had received influenza vaccine 14 days or more before enrollment; in addition, children aged <9 years were categorized as immunized if they had received 2 doses of influenza vaccine. Twenty-three children were excluded because they had received only 1 of the 2 recommended doses; this subgroup was too small to permit a separate analysis of VE for partial immunization.
VE was estimated by using logistic regression to compare patients with laboratory-confirmed influenza with patients who tested negative for influenza. The likelihood of receiving influenza vaccination in this population is associated with a propensity to seek health care, and use of test-negative controls helped adjust for this source of bias by estimating VE for medically attended influenza illness. Comparisons of this study design to traditional cohort and case-control methods for assessing VE have been published recently (3) . For this analysis, the enrolled patients were categorized into two groups: persons for whom influenza vaccine was recommended by the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) for the 2007-08 season based on age or an existing chronic medical condition † that increased their risk for influenza-related complications (i.e., the ACIP recommended group), and healthy children and adults aged 5-49 years (i.e., the healthy group).
Logistic regression models were adjusted for age, week of enrollment, and presence of a chronic medical condition. The last variable was not included in the models restricted to healthy patients aged 5-49 years. VE was estimated as 100 × [1 -adjusted odds ratio]) and was interpreted as zero if the percentage was negative. The first 59 influenza virus isolates obtained during the study were submitted to CDC for detailed antigenic characterization.
During January 21-February 8, 2008, a total of 1,779 patients were assessed for study eligibility after a clinical encounter for acute respiratory illness or febrile illness. A total of 850 (48%) did not meet eligibility criteria; 773 (91%) of exclusions resulted from absence of feverishness, chills, or cough or an illness duration 8 days or longer. Of the 929 eligible patients, 639 (69%) consented to the study and were tested for influenza infection. Final enrollment for this interim analysis was reduced to 616 patients after exclusion of 23 partially immunized children who had received only 1 of 2 recommended vaccine doses.
Influenza was detected by RT-PCR in 191 (31%) enrollees; 75% of influenza infections were type A. Distribution by sex was similar for patients who tested positive and patients who tested negative for influenza (Table 1) ; however, the median age was higher for patients who tested positive (21 years) than those who tested negative (10 years).
Approximately 19% of patients who tested positive and 39% of those who tested negative had been vaccinated against influenza.
The overall interim estimate of VE was 44% (Table 2) ; the estimate was higher among persons in the healthy group aged 5-49 years (54%). The overall estimate of VE for prevention of medically attended influenza A infections was 58%. No VE was observed for prevention of medically attended influenza B infections.
Subtyping by RT-PCR performed at CDC demonstrated that 40 of 41 influenza A specimens were influenza A (H3N2) viruses; the remaining specimen was an H3N2 and B virus mixture. Preliminary data on antigenic characterizations were available for nine influenza A (H3N2) viruses and 18 of 20 influenza B viruses. Two of nine influenza A (H3N2) viruses were A/Wisconsin/67/2005-like, the H3N2 component of the 2007-08 Northern Hemisphere vaccine; the other seven were A/Brisbane/10/2007-like (H3N2) viruses, a strain that is drifted from the between vaccine and circulating influenza strains. VE previously has been assessed sporadically in different populations and by using different methods. Annual systematic assessments of VE using laboratory-confirmed outcomes have not been available within an influenza season. Furthermore, antigenic characterization data rarely have been available for influenza viruses isolated from participants of VE studies, and not previously from the population for whom annual vaccination is recommended by ACIP. Despite a mismatch between the vaccine influenza A (H3N2) strain and seven of nine influenza A (H3N2) viruses isolated from study participants, the data in this report are consistent with results obtained in seasons with a moderate antigenic mismatch between vaccine and circulating strains of H3N2 viruses (1, 8) .
Based on preliminary analyses of A/Brisbane/10/2007-like (H3N2) viruses and the 2007-08 vaccine H3N2 strain using the method of antigenic mapping (9), an average fourfold difference was observed between the homologous titer for the vaccine strain and average titers for circulating strains. These differences were measured with hemagglutination inhibition tests by using a panel of reference postinfection ferret antisera. The degree of mismatch between the A/Wisconsin/67/2005 vaccine strain and H3N2 viruses tested at CDC thus far during the U.S. 2007-08 influenza season can be described as moderate in relation to antigenic distances seen over time for H3N2 viruses (10). By contrast, all the influenza B viruses isolated in the Marshfield Clinic study this season and antigenically characterized thus far belong to the B lineage not contained in this season's vaccine. Viruses from the B/Victoria-like lineage and B/Yamagata-like lineage are substantially more antigenically distinct from each other than A/Wisconsin/67/2005-like and A/Brisbane/10/2007-like H3N2 viruses are from each other.
The findings in this report are subject to at least four limitations. First, analyses were conducted while enrollment and laboratory testing were ongoing, and not all RT-PCR positive samples had yet been confirmed by culture. Thus, the preliminary subtype distribution and antigenic characterization results might not be representative of all patients in the study with influenza. Second, VE was estimated only for prevention of influenza among persons who sought care for acute respiratory illness, comparing patients who tested positive for influenza with patients who tested negative. Certain patients who tested negative for influenza might actually have had influenza virus infections, although RT-PCR is the most sensitive diagnostic test available. In addition, although simulation models have demonstrated that VE estimated with test-negative controls was close to the actual VE when test specificity was high, as is also the case with RT-PCR (3), this method is only beginning to be used in studies. VE was assessed against medically attended influenza and not against more severe outcomes of influenza infection, such as influenza hospitalizations; VE might vary with severity of the outcome studied. Third, if the antigenic characteristics of influenza viruses circulating in other regions of the United States differ substantially from viruses isolated from the Marshfield, Wisconsin, study participants, VE might vary by region. Finally, enrollment of patients continued in this study thorough March 28, and final analyses might differ from these interim assessments of VE.
These preliminary data based on study enrollment during January 21-February 8 suggest several conclusions. First, when assessing VE, laboratory data on antigenic characterization of circulating influenza viruses compared with vaccine strains should be interpreted together with data on the clinical effectiveness of vaccination in preventing laboratory-confirmed influenza illnesses. Although two of three vaccine strains were not optimally matched with circulating viruses this season, an interim VE estimate suggests that vaccination provided substantial protection against medically attended acute respiratory illness in this study population. In addition, intraseason estimates of VE, such as those from this analysis, might be useful to public health authorities and medical practitioners in their communications about the benefits of vaccination, especially late in the influenza season. Such data also might be helpful to practitioners when evaluating the need for antiviral treatment and prophylaxis for their patients. Therefore, creating systems that enable collection and dissemination of timely VE data during an influenza season are a priority for CDC. Finally, health-care providers should be aware of the types and subtypes of influenza circulating in their communities over the course of each influenza season. If influenza B strains predominate during the remainder of this season, providers can anticipate an increased risk for vaccine failures and should consider early use of antiviral medications for treatment and prophylaxis of persons at high risk for complications from influenza infection. Worldwide, rotavirus is the leading cause of severe gastroenteritis in children aged <5 years. In February 2006, a new human-bovine rotavirus vaccine, RotaTeq ® (Merck & Co., Inc., Whitehouse Station, New Jersey), was recommended by the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) for routine vaccination of U.S. infants. Three doses of RotaTeq are recommended at ages 2, 4, and 6 months (1). The first dose should be administered between ages 6 and 12 weeks, and vaccination should not be initiated for infants aged >12 weeks. Subsequent doses should be administered at 4-10 week intervals, with all doses administered by age 32 weeks. This schedule is consistent with the ages at which RotaTeq was administered during prelicensure trials (1) , and ACIP has recommended that RotaTeq only be administered at the ages for which safety and efficacy data are available. In 1999, a previous rhesushuman rotavirus vaccine, RotaShield ® (Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., Marietta, Pennsylvania), was withdrawn voluntarily from the U.S. market by the manufacturer because it was associated with intussusception, a form of bowel obstruction. The greatest risk for intussusception was noted after the first dose of RotaShield (2) . Data from a large-scale, prelicensure safety trial and postlicensure monitoring do not indicate an association between the current RotaTeq vaccine and intussusception (3) (4) (5) . CDC assessed rotavirus vaccination coverage among U.S. infants during To assess rotavirus vaccination coverage and adherence to the vaccination schedule, CDC examined data from three data systems: 1) immunization information systems (IISs), 2) IIS sentinel sites, and 3) the Vaccine Safety Datalink (VSD). IIS data are derived from confidential, computerized records of vaccine administration collected from multiple health-care providers within a defined geographic area (e.g., a state or city). CDC funds the development and operations of IISs under the Public Health Service Act.* In 2006, approximately 65% of U.S. children aged <6 years participated in an IIS (6) . IIS data were used to measure the number of rotavirus vaccine doses administered. Additional data were derived from the population-based IISs of Arizona, the District of Columbia, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, and Oregon, which were participants in CDC's IIS sentinel site project during [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] . Sentinel sites are a subset of the state IIS coverage area and represent >10,000 children aged <6 years in contiguous geographic counties, postal code areas, or U.S. Census tracts. These surveillance areas have high health-care provider participation and child enrollment (>90%) in the IIS. Procedures are in place in these sites to increase completeness and accuracy of the data (e.g., routine comparisons of IIS records with health-care provider data) (7) . IIS sentinel site data were used to assess rotavirus vaccination coverage and adherence to the ACIP-recommended vaccination schedule.
Rotavirus Vaccination
VSD is a collaborative project involving CDC and eight medical-care organizations in the United States that collect data on approximately 5.5 million persons annually (8) . VSD data provide comprehensive immunization histories and incorporate routine data-quality checks to promote data accuracy (9). VSD data were used to assess adherence to the ACIP-recommended vaccination schedule. For the assessment of adherence to the vaccination schedule, data on rotavirus vaccine administration by age (in weeks) and dose number in the series were reported by IIS sentinel sites through May 31, 2007, and by VSD through July 31, 2007. Some children might be enrolled in both IISs and VSD; however, this overlap is not anticipated to affect the estimates of adherence in either system, which were analyzed separately. In both systems, the date of vaccine administration was used to determine the dose number in the series, with the first date of vaccine administration counting as dose 1.
During A small percentage of doses were reported as administered completely outside the recommended age range of 6-32 weeks. Of all doses reported by IISs, IIS sentinel sites, and VSD, 0.1%, 0.2%, and 0.04%, respectively, were administered at age <6 weeks, and 1.8%, 1.6%, and 0.7%, respectively, were administered at age >32 weeks. Editorial Note: Routine vaccination of infants with rotavirus vaccine is anticipated to be the most effective public health intervention for reducing the substantial burden of rotavirus disease in children. Rotavirus vaccination coverage in the United States increased during the year after the February 2006 ACIP recommendation, and by May 2007, nearly half of infants aged 3 months in IIS sentinel sites had received 1 dose of rotavirus vaccine. Although the majority of health-care providers in these systems appear to be administering the vaccine as recommended, the findings in this report suggest that some infants are receiving their first dose of rotavirus vaccine outside of the ACIPrecommended schedule.
The findings in this report are subject to at least three limitations. First, in each data source, the date of vaccine administration was used to determine the dose number in the series, with the first date of vaccine administration counted as dose 1. Thus, doses counted as first doses but administered at approximately ages 17 and 26 weeks (i.e., the ages when second and third doses of vaccine are recommended) might actually represent second or third doses for infants whose previous doses were not recorded in these systems. Alternatively, the late first doses might represent infants receiving rotavirus vaccine during routine well-child visits at ages 4 and 6 months. To explore these hypotheses, analysis of IIS sentinel site and VSD data was restricted to infants who received >3 doses (i.e., infants who were more likely to have a first dose recorded); that analysis determined that a lower percentage of first doses were administered outside the recommended age range. However, small peaks in administration of first doses were still noted at age 17 weeks in both data sources, indicating that some children received rotavirus vaccine outside of the recommended schedule. The decrease in the percentage of first doses administered outside of the schedule might be attributable, in part, to the possibility that infants who receive all 3 doses are more likely to be vaccinated on schedule than other infants. Second, although IIS sentinel site and VSD data are monitored for accuracy and completeness, some vaccinations might not be entered into a child's electronic record, potentially resulting in an underestimation of vaccination coverage levels (10). Finally, the populations captured in IIS sentinel sites and VSD might not be nationally representative, which might limit the generalizability of these findings. The National Immunization Survey (NIS) provides childhood vaccination coverage data that are nationally representative. However, because the survey targets children aged 19-35 months, NIS data on rotavirus vaccination coverage will not be available until 2009 or 2010, nearly 2 to 3 years after the February 2006 ACIP recommendation for rotavirus vaccination.
Although these initial findings on rotavirus vaccination coverage are encouraging, public health professionals should continue to monitor vaccination coverage, identify potential barriers to vaccination, and increase vaccination coverage to levels similar to those for other recommended infant vaccines. In addition, health-care providers should remain vigilant in following the ACIP-recommended vaccination schedule for rotavirus vaccine and are reminded to report any adverse events to the Vaccine Adverse Events Reporting System. 
Laboratory-Acquired Vaccinia Exposures and InfectionsUnited States, 2005-2007
The last case of naturally acquired smallpox disease, caused by the orthopoxvirus variola virus (VARV), occurred in 1977, and the last laboratory-acquired case occurred in 1978. Smallpox was eradicated largely as the result of a worldwide vaccination campaign that used the related orthopoxvirus, vaccinia virus (VACV), as a live virus vaccine. Routine childhood vaccination for smallpox in the United States was terminated by 1972, but vaccination continues or has been reintroduced for specific groups, including laboratory workers who may be exposed to orthopoxviruses, members of the military, selected healthcare workers, and first responders. Severe complications of VACV infection can occur, particularly in persons with underlying risk factors, and secondary transmission of VACV also can occur (1) . VACV is used in numerous institutions for various research purposes, including fundamental studies of orthopoxviruses and use as a vector for the expression of foreign proteins (often antigens or immunomodulators) in eukaryotic cells and animal models. The widespread use of VACV for research has resulted in laboratory-acquired VACV infections, some requiring hospitalization. The current Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) guidelines recommend VACV vaccination for laboratory workers who handle cultures or animals contaminated or infected with nonhighly attenuated VACV strains or other orthopoxviruses that infect humans (2) . This report describes five recent occurrences of laboratory-acquired VACV infections and exposure and underscores the need for proper vaccination, laboratory safety, infection-control practices, and rapid medical evaluation of exposures in the context of orthopoxvirus research.
Case Reports
During 2005-2007, five cases of laboratory-acquired VACV infection were reported to CDC from state health departments and health-care providers in the United States. No national surveillance system exists to track laboratoryrelated VACV exposures, and the five cases were reported to CDC informally in the course of seeking consultation on treatment and prevention. All five cases involved the Western Reserve (WR) vaccinia strain. Cases 1-4 involved recombinant VACVs with an insertion at the thymidine kinase (TK) locus. Case 5 also involved a recombinant VACV, but details of the virus are not known (Table) . Case 1. In March 2005, a laboratory worker at an academic institution in Connecticut experienced a needlestick 
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to a finger while injecting mice with recombinant VACV. The laboratory worker was admitted to a hospital 3 days later with fever, lymphadenopathy, lymphangitis, and a hemorrhagic bulla at the site of the injury. The laboratory worker had been vaccinated with VACV as a child, and a second time approximately 10 years before the incident. Symptoms improved rapidly, and the laboratory worker was released after one night in the hospital. Infection with an orthopoxvirus was confirmed by testing in the state's Laboratory Response Network (LRN) laboratory. Case 2. In October 2006, a laboratory worker at an academic institution in Pennsylvania experienced a needlestick injury on the thumb while injecting a mouse with a recombinant WR VACV strain. The laboratory worker had previously declined VACV vaccination. Six days after the incident, the laboratory worker sought medical care, with a primary lesion at the site of the inoculation and a secondary lesion near the thumbnail. Nine days after inoculation, the laboratory worker reported malaise, and on the following day, had a fever of 102.0°F (38.9°C) and lymphadenopathy. By day 13, the laboratory worker was feeling better; on day 14, a surgeon debrided the lesion near the thumbnail. VACV infection was confirmed by polymerase chain reaction and viral culture at CDC.
Case 3. In May 2007, a laboratory worker at an academic institution in Iowa who had no previous history of VACV vaccination was unsheathing a sterile needle and received a needlestick in a finger. The laboratory worker continued with the experiments, which involved two recombinant VACVs, and did not change gloves or wash hands until finished. The typical challenge dose for this set of experiments was 3 × 10 6 plaque-forming units (pfu). Approximately 11 days after the needlestick, the laboratory worker developed symptoms of VACV infection, including fever and chills, and noted a lesion and swelling at the site of the needlestick. The laboratory worker sought medical attention at an urgent-care facility and informed the clinical staff of the incident. A diagnosis of VACV infection was confirmed by the state LRN laboratory. The laboratory worker recovered fully.
Case 4. In August 2007, a laboratory worker at a government facility in Maryland unintentionally inoculated a finger with approximately 5 µL of a solution containing VACV, after injection of a research animal. The inoculum contained up to 10 4 pfu of the virus, which was a recombinant strain of WR VACV. The laboratory worker did not wash the exposed area immediately, but instead immersed the wound in a disinfectant containing hypochlorite for a few minutes.
The laboratory worker had received a primary VACV vaccination in 2001, but immunization was unsuccessful (i.e., no lesion developed at the site of the vaccination). On the day of the incident, the laboratory worker went to the occupational health clinic and was revaccinated with VACV. Vaccinia immunoglobulin was not administered. When the worker was reevaluated on days 3, 4, and 5 postvaccination, no evidence of VACV infection was observed at the site of inoculation, and a characteristic lesion developed at the site of vaccination, evidence of a take.
Case 5. In September 2007, a laboratory worker at an academic institution in New Hampshire who had no history of vaccination incurred a minor scratch to a finger with a small-gauge needle containing 5 × 10 4 pfu/mL of recombinant WR VACV, which was being used for injecting mice. The laboratory worker felt pain, but did not bleed, and so continued working. Seven days later, the laboratory worker noted a pustule at the site of the scratch, sought medical attention the following day, and was hospitalized when red streaking appeared from the site of the scratch and extended into the axilla. Samples from the pustule were submitted to the state LRN laboratory, where VACV infection was confirmed. The laboratory worker was afebrile and recovered without specific therapy.
Editorial Note: Although laboratory-related VACV exposures are rare, the cases described in this report demonstrate the need for laboratory workers to comply with ACIP vaccination recommendations (3, 4) . The total number of laboratories or researchers using nonhighly attenuated-VACV strains is unknown; therefore, estimating the incidence of VACV infection among at-risk laboratory workers is not possible. However, CDC does continue to receive reports of laboratory-related VACV exposures (fewer than five per year).
Laboratory-acquired exposure to VACV can lead to severe or atypical infections; exposures can be associated with a high inoculum or can occur through a route that has a high risk of complications, such as ocular VACV infection (5) . Recombinant strains of VACV are commonly generated by insertion of genetic material in the TK locus of the virus. Because inactivation of the TK locus has been associated with decreased VACV virulence in mice (6), some laboratory workers might perceive TK insertion mutants as attenuated; however, at least four of the infections and attendant illnesses described in this report involved VACV strains that had insertions at the TK locus. Additionally, recombinant strains of VACV commonly encode foreign gene products, and the possibility exists that resultant recombinant strains might have increased pathogenicity in humans.
ACIP currently recommends VACV vaccination at least every 10 years for laboratory workers who handle cultures or animals infected with nonhighly attenuated orthopoxviruses (2), including the WR strain of VACV. Reasons the five persons described in this report failed to meet ACIP recommendations included refusal of vaccination, absence of follow-through on a failed vaccination take, and overdue revaccination. Because some laboratory workers are hesitant to receive VACV vaccination for fear of side effects, laboratory directors and occupational health programs are encouraged to provide education regarding the risks and potential benefits of vaccination, including, for the latter, the prevention or reduction of severe complications from laboratory-acquired VACV infection. This benefit accrues from receiving a carefully measured (rather than undetermined) dose of a well-characterized vaccine formulation, which results in local infection at a predetermined site on the body, and resultant memory-immune response on subsequent exposure. Laboratory workers should adhere to the vaccination schedule recommended by ACIP (2) . Persons who have a contraindication to VACV vaccination should consider carefully the possible consequences of a laboratory-acquired VACV infection in their decisions to work with nonhighly attenuated VACV.
Laboratory directors, research staff, and institutional biosafety officials can further minimize the likelihood of inadvertent VACV exposure by reinforcing proper laboratory safety procedures, such as proper use of personal protective equipment and safe needle-handling practices when handling VACV-infected cultures or animals.
When a potential exposure occurs, the laboratory worker should immediately and thoroughly wash the affected body part with water and the available cleaning product sanctioned by their biosafety office; eyewash protocols should be followed for ocular exposures. The laboratory worker should then report the incident and strain to which they might have been exposed to the laboratory director and the occupational health clinic of the institution. VACV vaccination shortly after an exposure might help minimize the effects of inadvertent VACV infection. If severe illness or ocular infection occur, arrangements can be made with CDC for the administration of vaccinia immunoglobulin (2, 3) . The laboratory worker in case 4 immediately disinfected the wound and received prompt postexposure vaccination the day of the laboratory incident; this might have contributed to preventing infection at the site of the needlestick.
Secondary spread of VACV represents an additional public health concern. Patients with suspected VACV infection should be instructed by their caregivers in appropriate lesion care (2) as a precaution against spread of infection to another body site or to another person. Special care must be taken to avoid transmission to social contacts and persons in the health-care setting, particularly those with increased risk for severe illness from exposure to VACV, such as persons with atopic dermatitis, pregnant females, and immunocompromised persons.
Finally, occupational health clinics and health-care workers who might provide primary care for a laboratory worker exposed to VACV should become familiar with protocols for recognition and diagnosis of suspected poxvirus infections (3). Laboratory workers also should be instructed to seek care from appropriately trained health-care providers at their supporting institution. Appropriate infectioncontrol measures should be instituted at the time of presentation of a patient with a suspected case, and whenever possible, clinical care should be provided by persons who have been vaccinated with VACV. Clinics also should review procedures for communication with and confirmation of orthopoxvirus infection through the LRN or the Poxvirus Program (404-639-4129) at CDC. 
Antigenic Characterization
States are requested to submit a subset of their influenza virus isolates to CDC for further antigenic characterization. Since September 30, 2007, CDC has antigenically characterized 608 influenza viruses submitted by WHO 
Outpatient Illness Surveillance
For the week ending April 5, 2008, the percentage of outpatient visits for influenza-like illness (ILI) § reported by approximately 1,400 U.S. sentinel providers in 50 states, Chicago, the District of Columbia, New York City, and the U.S. Virgin Islands was 1.7%, which was below the national baseline of 2.2%. ¶ This season, the percentage of outpatient visits for ILI exceeded the national baseline for 13 consecutive weeks. The percentage of outpatient visits for ILI first exceeded baseline during the week ending December 29 and peaked at 5.9% during the week ending February 16. The percentage of outpatient visits for acute respiratory illness (ARI)** reported by approximately 350 § Defined as a temperature of >100.0°F (>37.8°C), oral or equivalent, and cough and/or sore throat, in the absence of a known cause other than influenza. ¶ The national and regional baselines are the mean percentage of visits for ILI during noninfluenza weeks for the previous three seasons plus two standard deviations. A noninfluenza week is a week during which <10% of specimens tested positive for influenza. National and regional percentages of patient visits for ILI are weighted on the basis of state population. Use of the national baseline for regional data is not appropriate. ** Based on International Classification of Diseases, Ninth Revision codes for ARI:
460-66 and 480-88. † † BioSense is a national surveillance system that receives, analyzes, and evaluates health data from multiple sources, include 1) approximately 1,150 VA/DoD hospitals and ambulatory-care clinics; 2) multihospital systems, local hospitals, and state and regional syndromic surveillance systems in 37 states; and 3) Laboratory Corporation of America (LabCorp) test results. § § The national, regional, and age-specific baselines are the mean percentage of visits for ARI during noninfluenza weeks for the previous three seasons plus two standard deviations. A noninfluenza week is a week during which <10% of specimens tested positive for influenza. Use of a national baseline for regional data is not appropriate. ¶ ¶ Levels of activity are 1) no activity; 2) sporadic: isolated laboratory-confirmed influenza cases or a laboratory-confirmed outbreak in one institution, with no increase in activity; 3) local: increased ILI , or at least two institutional outbreaks (ILI or laboratory-confirmed influenza) in one region with recent laboratory evidence of influenza in that region (virus activity no greater than sporadic in other regions); 4) regional: increased ILI activity or institutional outbreaks (ILI or laboratory-confirmed influenza) in at least two but less than half of the regions in the state with recent laboratory evidence of influenza in those regions; and 5) widespread: increased ILI activity or institutional outbreaks (ILI or laboratory-confirmed influenza) in at least half the regions in the state with recent laboratory evidence of influenza in the state.
U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and 800 Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) BioSense † † outpatient treatment facilities for the week ending April 5 was 2.2%, which was below the national baseline of 3.2% § § (Figure 2 ).
State-Specific Activity Levels
During the week ending April 5, 2008, influenza activity was reported as widespread ¶ ¶ in six states (Connecticut, Maine, Maryland, New York, Pennsylvania, and Vermont) (Figure 3 ). In addition, regional activity was reported by 11 states (Alaska, 
Influenza-Associated Pediatric Hospitalizations
Pediatric hospitalizations associated with laboratoryconfirmed influenza infections are monitored by two population-based surveillance networks, the Emerging Infections Program (EIP) and the New Vaccine Surveillance , EIP sites reported a preliminary laboratory-confirmed influenza-associated hospitalization rate of 1.32 per 10,000 for children aged 0-17 years. For children aged 0-4 years, the rate was 3.47 per 10,000, and for children aged 5-17 years, the rate was 0.45 per 10,000. Differences in the rate estimates between the NVSN and the EIP systems likely result from the different case-finding methods and the different populations monitored.***
Pneumonia and Influenza-Related Mortality
Pneumonia and influenza (P&I) was listed as an underlying or contributing cause of death for 8.9% of all deaths reported through the 122 Cities Mortality Reporting System for the week ending April 5, 2008 . This percentage was above the epidemic threshold of 6.9% for the week † † † and marked the thirteenth consecutive week that the proportion of all deaths attributed to P&I was above the epidemic threshold (Figure 4 ). The proportion of deaths from P&I exceeded the epidemic threshold during week ending January 5 and peaked at 9.1% during the week ending March 15.
Influenza-Related Pediatric Mortality
During September 30, 2007-April 5, 2008, a total of 65 pediatric deaths among children aged <18 years associ- * Levels of activity are 1) no activity; 2) sporadic: isolated laboratory-confirmed influenza cases or a laboratory-confirmed outbreak in one institution, with no increase in activity; 3) local: increased ILI, or at least two institutional outbreaks (ILI or laboratory-confirmed influenza) in one region with recent laboratory evidence of influenza in that region (virus activity no greater than sporadic in other regions); 4) regional: increased ILI activity or institutional outbreaks (ILI or laboratory-confirmed influenza) in at least two but less than half of the regions in the state with recent laboratory evidence of influenza in those regions; and 5) widespread: increased ILI activity or institutional outbreaks (ILI or laboratory-confirmed influenza) in at least half the regions in the state with recent laboratory evidence of influenza in the state. ILI during noninfluenza weeks for the previous three seasons plus two standard deviations. A noninfluenza week is a week during which <10% of speciments tested positive for influenza. National and regional percentages of patient visits for ILI are weighted on the basis of state population. Use of the national baseline for regional data is not appropriate. § The national, regional, and age-specific baselines are the mean percentage of visits for ARI during noninfluenza weeks for the previous three seasons plus two standard deviations. A noninfluenza week is a week during which <10% of specimens tested positive for influenza. Use of national baseline for regional data is not appropriate. Cities Mortality Reporting System is projected using a robust regression procedure in which a periodic regression model is applied to the observed percentage of deaths from P&I that occurred during the preceding 5 years. The epidemic threshold is 1.645 standard deviations above the seasonal baseline.
ated with laboratory-confirmed influenza were reported from 26 states, New York City, and Chicago through the National Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System. The median age of decedents was 4.5 years (range: 1 month to 17.8 years). During the preceding three influenza seasons, the total number of influenza-related pediatric deaths reported to CDC ranged from 46 to 74.
Resistance to Antiviral Medications
During this influenza season, an increase in the number of influenza viruses resistant to the neuraminidase inhibitor, oseltamivir, has been observed. Among the 1,153 influenza A and B viruses tested during the 2007-08 influenza season, to date, 84 (8.3%) have been found to be resistant to oseltamivir. All the oseltamivir-resistant viruses have been influenza A (H1N1) viruses and have been determined to share the same genetic mutation that confers oseltamivir resistance. These 84 viruses represent 10.2% of the 824 influenza A (H1N1) viruses that have been tested, an increase from four (0.7%) of 588 influenza A (H1N1) viruses tested during the 2006-07 season. No resistance to oseltamivir has been identified among the 194 influenza A (H3N2) or the 135 influenza B viruses tested, and no antiviral resistance to zanamivir has been detected in any influenza A or B viruses. Resistance to adamantanes (amantadine and rimantadine) continues to be high among influenza A viruses. Of 261 influenza A (H3N2) viruses tested, 260 (99.6%) were resistant to adamantanes. Adamantane resistance among influenza A (H1N1) viruses also has been detected, but at a lower level. Of 729 influenza A (H1N1) viruses tested, 81 (11.1%) were resistant to adamantanes. The adamantanes have no activity against influenza B viruses.
Based on the level of oseltamivir resistance observed in only one influenza A subtype (H1N1), persisting high levels of resistance to adamantanes in A (H3N2) viruses, and the predominance of A (H3N2) viruses circulating in the United States during the 2007-08 season with cocirculation of influenza B viruses, CDC continues to recommend the use of oseltamivir and zanamivir for the treatment or chemoprophylaxis of influenza (2). Use of amantadine or rimantadine is not recommended. Editorial Note: By some indicators, this influenza season has been more severe than the previous three seasons. Influenza activity in the United States remained low until January, peaked in mid-February, and decreased thereafter. For the week ending April 5, 2008, widespread activity was reported in six states, and regional activity was reported in 11 states, a decrease from mid-February, when 49 states reported widespread activity and one state reported regional activity. During peak activity of the previous three influenza seasons, the number of states reporting widespread or regional activity ranged from 41 to 49 states. During the 2007-08 season, the percentage of outpatient visits for ILI peaked at 5.9%, exceeded the national baseline for 13 consecutive weeks, and declined to 1.7% during the week ending April 5. During the previous three influenza seasons, the peak percentage of visits for ILI ranged from 3.2% to 5.4% and exceeded baseline levels for 14 to 16 consecutive weeks. To date, the percentage of deaths attributable to P&I peaked at 9.1% and exceeded the epidemic threshold for 13 consecutive weeks this season. For the week ending April 5, the proportion of deaths attributable to P&I was 8.9%. During the previous three seasons, the peak percentage of deaths attributable to P&I ranged from 7.7% to 8.9%, and the total number of weeks above the epidemic threshold ranged from 1 to 11 consecutive weeks. P&I mortality is higher this season than the previous three seasons, which were mild. The 2007-08 season is similar to the 2003-04 season, when the percentage of deaths attributable to P&I peaked at 10.4% and the number of consecutive weeks above the epidemic threshold was 9 weeks. * The epidemic threshold is 1.645 standard deviations above the seasonal baseline. † The seasonal baseline is projected using a robust regression procedure that applies a periodic regression model to the observed percentage of deaths from P&I during the preceding 5 years. Clinical vaccine effectiveness cannot be accurately predicted using these data. A case-control study to estimate the effectiveness of trivalent inactivated influenza vaccine was conducted this season in Marshfield, Wisconsin. Preliminary results from subjects enrolled during January 21-February 8 show an overall vaccine effectiveness of 44%, suggesting that vaccination provided substantial protection against influenza-associated, medically attended illness in the study population, despite the suboptimal vaccine match (3). These preliminary results are similar to previous studies, which have shown that influenza vaccination provides measurable protection against influenza illness and influenza-related complications and death, even when vaccine strains are antigenically distinct from circulating strains (4-7).
As a supplement to influenza vaccination, antiviral drugs have aided in the control and prevention of influenza. Recent studies have identified a considerable protective effect of oseltamivir treatment against complications associated with influenza (8), including death among older adults hospitalized with laboratory-confirmed influenza (9). This season, resistance to the influenza antiviral drug oseltamivir among influenza A (H1N1) viruses (84 [10.2%] of 824 tested) has been detected. All 84 resistant influenza A (H1N1) viruses identified in the United States this season share the same genetic mutation; this mutation is the most common mutation in this subtype that confers resistance to oseltamivir. Increased resistance to oseltamivir among influenza A (H1N1) viruses has been reported from many countries this season (10). No oseltamivir resistance has been detected among influenza A (H3N2) or B viruses currently circulating in the United States. Given the low level of resistance to oseltamivir, the finding of resistance only in some influenza A (H1N1) viruses, and no resistance to zanamivir, these drugs continue to be recommended for the treatment and prophylaxis of influenza (2) . Although recommendations for use of antiviral medications have not changed, enhanced surveillance for detection of oseltamivirresistant influenza viruses is ongoing and will enable continued monitoring of changing trends over time. In addition to vaccination and antivirals, other means of decreasing the spread and impact of influenza include staying home from work or school when ill, avoiding others who are sick, covering the nose or mouth with a tissue when coughing or sneezing, and frequent hand washing. Additional information is available at http://www.cdc.gov/flu/protect/ habits.htm.
Influenza surveillance reports for the United States are posted online weekly during October-May and are available at http://www.cdc.gov/flu/weekly/fluactivity.htm. Additional information regarding influenza viruses, influenza surveillance, the influenza vaccine, and avian influenza is available at http://www.cdc.gov/flu. 
Notice to Readers

National Infant Immunization WeekApril 19-26, 2008
The week of April 19-26, 2008, is National Infant Immunization Week (NIIW) and Vaccination Week in the Americas (VWA). Immunization is one of the most effective ways to protect infants and children from potentially serious diseases. During the week, hundreds of communities throughout the United States are expected to sponsor activities to emphasize the health benefits of timely vaccination and the importance to parents, health-care providers, and communities of maintaining high vaccination coverage. One message stressed during this week will be the key role of the ongoing relationship among parents and their children's health-care providers in vaccination programs. CDC encourages parents to talk to their healthcare providers about vaccinations at any time.
The week's activities provide an opportunity to showcase the success of vaccination in saving the lives and protecting the health of children. The currently recommended childhood vaccination schedule (1) includes vaccines that prevent infectious diseases such as measles, polio, whooping cough, some forms of meningitis and pneumonia, and liver cancer. An analysis of the impact of seven vaccines showed that they would prevent approximately 33,500 deaths and 14 million illnesses per annual birth cohort (2) .
NIIW-VWA events held in collaboration with CDC and state and local health departments will be hosted in Rhode Island, Connecticut, and Washington. Events held in collaboration with CDC, state and local health departments, the United States-Mexico Border Health Commission, and the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), will be hosted in communities along the U.S.-Mexico border, with kick-off events held in El Paso, Texas, and Sunland Park, New Mexico. In all locations, events will include education activities for health-care providers, media briefings, and immunization clinics.
VWA, sponsored by PAHO, targets children and other vulnerable and underserved populations who have low vaccination coverage rates, in all countries in the Western hemisphere. To support NIIW and VWA events nationwide, CDC provides annually updated English-and Spanishlanguage planning guides, campaign materials, and public relations tools. These include timely key messages, radio public service announcements, and sample media kits. These resources and event listings are available at http:// www.cdc.gov/vaccines/events/niiw/default.htm. Additional information about VWA is available at http://www.paho. org/english/dd/pin/vw2008.htm. 
Notice to Readers
International Course in Applied Epidemiology
CDC and Emory University's Rollins School of Public Health will cosponsor the International Course in Applied Epidemiology, to be held September 22-October 17, 2008, in Atlanta, Georgia. The course is designed for public health professionals from countries other than the United States. It will include presentations and discussions of epidemiologic principles, basic statistical analysis, public health surveillance, field investigations, surveys and sampling, and the epidemiologic aspects of current major public health problems in global health.
Group discussions of epidemiologic case exercises based on field investigations will be held during the course. Participants are encouraged to give a short presentation reviewing some epidemiologic data from their own country. The course also will include computer training using Epi Info (Windows version), a software program for epidemiologists developed at CDC and the World Health Organization.
Prerequisites are familiarity with the vocabulary and principles of basic epidemiology, or completion of CDC's Principles of Epidemiology home-study course or equivalent. Preference will be given to applicants whose work involves priority public health problems in international health. Tuition is charged.
Additional † Respondents who had at least 12 drinks in their lifetime and more than three drinks per week, up to 14 drinks per week (on average) for men, and more than three drinks per week up to seven drinks per week (on average) for women were moderate drinkers. Adults who had at least 12 drinks in their lifetime and more than 14 drinks per week (on average) for men and more than seven drinks per week (on average) for women were heavier drinkers. § Estimates are age adjusted using the projected 2000 U.S. population as the standard population and using four age groups: 18-24 years, 25-44 years, 45-64 years, and >65 years. Estimates are based on household interviews of a sample of the civilian, noninstitutionalized U.S. population and are derived from the National Health Interview Survey sample adult component. Data were combined from three years of surveys to increase reliability of estimates in smaller subpopulations. ¶ 95% confidence interval. ** Includes Chinese, Filipino, Asian Indian, Japanese, Vietnamese, and Korean subpopulations; also includes Other Asian and Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander subpopulations, which are not shown separately because of small sample sizes. † † Among persons who reported a single Asian subpopulation.
During 2004-2006, Asian adults had the lowest percentage of current moderate or heavier drinkers (9%), when compared with whites (22%), American Indian/Alaska Natives (15%), Hispanics (13%), and blacks (12%). However, the percentage of moderate or heavier drinkers varied substantially among Asian subpopulations: Japanese (14%), Korean (10%), Filipino (9%), Chinese (7%), Vietnamese (6%), and Asian Indian (6%). Ehrlichiosis, human monocytic (analogous to E. chaffeensis); Ehrlichiosis, human granulocytic (analogous to Anaplasma phagocytophilum), and Ehrlichiosis, unspecified, or other agent (which included cases unable to be clearly placed in other categories, as well as possible cases of E. ewingii). † † Data for H. influenzae (all ages, all serotypes) are available in Table II . § § Updated monthly from reports to the Division of HIV/AIDS Prevention, National Center for HIV/AIDS, Viral Hepatitis, STD, and TB Prevention. Implementation of HIV reporting influences the number of cases reported. Updates of pediatric HIV data have been temporarily suspended until upgrading of the national HIV/AIDS surveillance data management system is completed. Data for HIV/AIDS, when available, are displayed in Table IV , which appears quarterly. ¶ ¶ Updated weekly from reports to the Influenza Division, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases. Sixty-six cases occurring during the 2007-08 influenza season have been reported. *** Two measles cases reported for the current week were indigenous while one was imported. † † † Data for meningococcal disease (all serogroups) are available in Table II . § § § In 2008, Q fever acute and chronic reporting categories were recognized as a result of revisions to the Q fever case definition. Prior to that time, case counts were not differentiated with respect to acute and chronic Q fever cases. ¶ ¶ ¶ No rubella cases were reported for the current week. **** Updated weekly from reports to the Division of Viral and Rickettsial Diseases, National Center for Zoonotic, Vector-Borne, and Enteric Diseases.
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FIGURE I. Selected notifiable disease reports, United States, comparison of provisional 4-week totals April 12, 2008, with historical data
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